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RETROACTIVE EXCISE TAXES
THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO IMPOSE EXCISE TAXES
RETROACTIVELY*
BY ABRAHAM LOWENHAUPT
Very recently the United States Supreme Court held the pro-
cessing taxes under the National Agricultural Adjustment Act
unconstitutional. The Secretary of Agriculture, in public ad-
dresses, denounced the action of the Supreme Court in ordering
the refund of the amounts which were paid into the Federal
District courts, pending the final determination of preliminary
injunctions issued by such courts, and he and those who sponsored
that illegal statute now urge upon Congress that it impose a
similar processing tax retroactively to replace and take up the
former illegal exaction.
At this time, an analysis of the power of Congress in this
respect is in the national interest. ". . . the power to destroy
which may be the consequence of taxation is a reason why the
right to tax should be confined to subjects which may be law-
fully embraced therein, even although it happens that in some
particular instance no great harm may be caused by the exercise
of the taxing authority as to a subject which is beyond its scope."
(Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41)
Excise taxes have always been borne with resentment and
occasionally in history have been a contributing cause of rebellion
and of the downfall of governments. Samuel Johnson defined an
excise as "A hateful tax levied upon commodities and adjudged
not by the common judges of property, but by wretches hired by
those to whom this excise is paid."
Blackstone says (Jones Ed. Sec. 441):
"... But, at the same time, the rigor and arbitrary pro-
ceedings of excise laws seem hardly compatible with the
temper of a free nation. For the frauds that might be com-
mitted in this branch of the revenue, unless a strict watch is
kept, make it necessary, wherever it is established, to give
the officers a power of entering and searching the houses of
such as deal in excisable commodities, at any hour of the day,
and in many cases, of the night likewise. And the proceed-
ings in case of transgressions are so summary and sudden,
* For a previous article supporting another view of the problem see Ralph
R. Neuhoff, "Retrospective Tax Laws," 21 St. L. L. Rev. 1.
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that a man may be convicted in two days' time in the penalty
of many thousand pounds by two commissioners or justices
of the peace; to the total exclusion of the trial by jury, and
disregard of the common law. . . . Its original establish-
ment was in 1643, and its progress was gradual; being at
first laid upon those persons and commodities where it was
supposed the hardship would be least perceivable, viz., the
makers and venders of beer, ale, cider and perry, and the
royalists at Oxford soon followed the example of their breth-
ren at Westminster by imposing a similar duty; both sides
protesting that it should be continued no longer than to the
end of the war, and then be utterly abolished. But the parlia-
ment at Westminster soon after imposed it on flesh, wine,
tobacco, sugar, and such a multitude of other commodities,
that it might fairly be denominated general: in pursuance
of the plain laid down by Mr. Pymme (who seems to have
been the father of the excise) in his letter to Sir John
Hotham; signifying, 'that they had proceeded in the ex-
cise to many particulars, and intended to go on further; but
that it would be necessary to use the people to it by little and
little.' . .. But, from its first original to the present time,
its very name has been odious to the people of England.(then following a list of excises, he says) "A list, which no
friend to his country would wish to see further increased."
With a change of time and place, Blackstone's statement is the
history of the excise in the United States: It was first imposed
upon the manufacture of whiskey and was the cause of the
'Whiskey Insurrection" in 1794. It was then contended that
there are certain natural rights which no government confers
and upon which no government can impose a condition. In many
later cases, it has been urged that the United States may excise
only privileges which it grants and can withhold, for instance,
that the privilege of inheritance being granted by the states can-
not be taxed by the United States. Neither limitation has been
sustained (Knowlton v. Moore, supra). As Pymme proposed, it
was introduced "little by little" until, as appears from the list
hereafter written, it has become almost general.
The power of Congress to impose taxes is conferred by Section
8, Article 1 of the Constitution:
"The Congress shall have power:
To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to
pay the debts and provide for the common defence and gen-
eral welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and
excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
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"No tax has yet been found which is not either a direct tax or
included under the words, duties, imposts and excises." (Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 557). Section 9, Article
1 of the Constitution requires that capitation and other direct
taxes imposed by Congress shall be proportioned to the census.
Because of this limitation, no taxes, conceded to be direct, have
been imposed since the first years of the nation. All internal
revenue taxes now imposed by Congress are, or purport to be,
excise taxes.
Johnson and Blackstone limited the excise to commodities at
the points of consumption or retail sale. As has happened with
most terms describing governmental functions, the meaning of
the word "excise" has been broadened by practise and the mount-
ing complexity of social relations.
It is defined in Flint v. Stone Tracy & Co.:, 220 U. S. 106
(quoting Cooley Constitutional Limitations) as follows:
"Excises are 'taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale, or
consumption of commodities within the country, upon
licenses to pursue certain occupations, and upon corporate
privileges.'"
In Thomas v. United States, 192 U. S. 363, the Court said:
"There is no occasion to attempt to confine the words,
'duties, imposts, and excises' to the limits of precise defini-
tion. We think that they were used comprehensively to
cover customs and excise duties imposed on importation,
consumption, manufacture, and sale of certain commodities,
privileges, particular business transactions, vocations, occu-
pations, and the like."
In United States v. Philadelphia, 262 Fed. 188, it is said that
"it is a charge for the privilege of following an occupation, or
trade, or carrying on a business."
In Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, the court, quoting part of
the argument said:
"Taking these three sources of information and combining
them, it would seem that the leading idea of excise is that
it is a tax, laid without rule or principle, upon consumable
articles, upon the process of their manufacture and upon
licenses to sell them."
At the present time, the national government excises, among
other things, sales of real estate, the issuance or transfer of
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stocks or bonds, the sale or manufacture of brewers' wort, grape
juice and grape syrup, crude petroleum, fuel oil, lubricating oil,
gas, coal and coke, tires and tubes, toilet preparation, fur articles,
jewelry, automobiles, radios, mechanical refrigerators, sporting
goods, firearms and cartridges, cameras, matches, chewing gum,
playing cards, electricity, products of tobacco, liquor, wines, beer,
lease of safety deposit vault, the use of telegraph, telephone,
radio or cable for messages, transportation of oil by pipe lines,
the use of a corporate franchise, admissions to places of amuse-
ment, dues and assessments paid to a social club, sales on an
exchange, passage tickets to points out of the United States,
transfers of interests in silver, the making of a gift, the transfer
of property at death, and the receipt of income, a list, which in
the words of Blackstone, "no friend to his country would wish
to see further increased." Before the Supreme Court's decision,
the processing of most food materials and of cotton was also
excised.
An excise is a condition or toll imposed upon the exercise of
a privilege. The nature of an excise shows that, in theory at
least, it is voluntarily assumed by the taxpayer. The tax becomes
due only when the privilege is exercised. One is not compelled
to exercise the privilege.
In Soutk Carolina v. United States, 39 Ct. of Claims, 257-286,
affirmed 199 U. S. 437, the Court said:
"A tax is obligatory; from it there is no escape. An excise
is voluntary; the purchaser who would pay it cannot be com-
pelled to purchase."
In Thomas v. United States, supra, the Court said:
"The stamp duty is contingent on the happening of the
of sale, and the element of absolute and unavoidable demand
is lacking."
In New York Trust Company v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 1. c. 349,
concerning the estate tax upon the passage of property at death,
it is said:
"It is argued that when the tax is on the privilege of re-
ceiving, the tax is indirect because it may be avoided;
whereas here the tax is inevitable, and therefore direct. But
that matter also is disposed of by Knowlton v. Moore, not by
an attempt to make some scientific distinction, which would
be at least difficult, but on an interpretation of language by
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its traditional use,-on the practical and historical ground
that this kind of tax always has been regarded as the an-
tithesis of a direct tax,-has ever been treated as a duty or
excise, because of the particular occasion which gives rise
to its levy.'"
The transmission of property at death is ruled to be a privi-
lege. (Nichols v. Coolidge,, 274 U. S. 537). One does not need
to be possessed of any property. If one dies possessed of prop-
erty and passes it to his heirs or by his will, he has exercised a
privilege and voluntarily subjected the property which he leaves
-his estate-to excise.
Under the definition of an excise-a condition or toll imposed
upon the exercise of a privilege-it is plain that it cannot be
imposed after the privilege is exercised. After the privilege has
been exercised, there is nothing left to excise. Thus, in Forbes
Boat Line v. Board of Commissioners, 258 U. S. 338, where the
legislature of Florida undertook in 1919 to impose a toll upon
the plaintiff for passage through the locks of a canal" in 1917,
the Court said:
"If we apply that principle this statute is invalid. For if
the legislature of Florida had attempted to make the plain-
tiff pay in 1919 for passages through the lock of a canal that
took place before 1917, without any promise of reward,
there is nothing in the case as it stands to indicate that it
could have done so any more effectively than it could have
made a man pay a baker for a gratuitous deposit of rolls."
The principle is not as clear cut as the foregoing statement
indicates, nor is it recognized without contradiction. The Con-
stitution imposes no plain limitation upon the power of Congress
in this respect. In Frew v. Bowers, 12 F. (2d) 1. c. 630, this
question is considered and Justice Hand, in his concurring
opinion, said:
"If it were necessary that an excise should be imposed
upon the activity or privilege which determines the tax, I
should at once agree that it could not operate upon one
exercised or enjoyed before the law was passed. There would
be no subject-matter to tax. But I cannot see that it need be
so imposed, and cases like Billings v. U. S. 232 U. S. 261,
U. S. v. Bennett, 232 U. S. 299, Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U. S. 107, and Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 240
U. S. 1, seem to me to establish the contrary. I can find no
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helpful definition of excise, but there seems no reason why
it should not be imposed upon individuals personally, merely
because of some activity in which they have engaged or
privilege which they have enjoyed. These will serve to de-
fine the class to be taxed, and the tax need not necessarily
be direct, for that is purely a historical and conventional
question. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 S. Ct. 747,
44 L. Ed. 969."
As appears from a later quotation from Justice Hand's concurr-
ing opinion in Frew v. Bowers, the court held the statute uncon-
stitutional, if applicable, as far as it was retroactive, and the
quoted statement was merely argumentative.
Mr. Justice Brandeis in Untermeyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S.
440, in his dissenting opinion, stated:
"The need of the government for revenue has hitherto
been deemed a sufficient justification for making a tax mea-
sure retroactive whenever the imposition seemed consonant
with justice and the conditions were not such as would ordi-
narily involve hardship."
An examination of the authorities cited in the quotation above
from Frew v. Bowers, and in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brandeis, discloses that the taxes approved in thoses cases, if
retroactive at all, were so only to a limited extent.
In Billings v. U. S. cited in Frew v. Bowers, the act of August
5, 1909, imposed a tax on the first day of September of each
year upon the use of every foreign-built yacht now or hereafter
owned or chartered for more than six months by a citizen of the
United States. The court held "that the six months clause is
concerned not with the period when the tax imposed shall be
levied and collected, but addresses itself to the subject-matter
upon which the tax is placed; in other words, it qualifies the
word 'charter,' and therefore only indicates when the use of a
chartered vessel shall become subject to the duty imposed." So
far as the tax applied to the use between the date of the passage
of the act and the first day of the following September, it was
certainly not retroactive in any sense. The Court said: "Again
let it be conceded that the causing the tax for the annual period
to become due in September, 1909, is to give it in some respects
a retroactive effect, such concession does not cause the act to be
beyond the power of Congress under the Constitution to adopt."
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United States v. Bennett, also cited, construed the same statute.
In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., the court sustained the act, passed
August 5, 1909, imposing a tax upon the doing of business in a
corporate capacity measured by the income of the calendar year
1909. In a proper sense, it was not retroactive at all, because it
applied only to corporations doing business on the date of or
after the passage of the act. In Stockdale v. The Ins. Company,
20 Wall. 323, cited by Justice Brandeis, the Court held that an
income tax was constitutional which was not retroactive beyond
the beginning of the year of the passage of the act. The same
ruling was made in Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240
U. S. 1. The income of a year is taxed as a unit and if the whole
unit is not passed when the tax is imposed, the imposition of the
tax is, in a sense, not retroactive at all.
In a general way these cases disclose the limits of retroactivity
in taxation which the courts have sustained. Justice Brandeis also
cites the fact that the Revenue Act of 1918 was not passed until
February, 1919 and no one contested the validity of this Act. A
similar fact is the sole authority for the ruling of the court in
the case of Stockdale v. Insurance Company, supra, which is the
prime citation in every decided case and in every obiter state-
ment in various opinions of the courts that Congress may impose
retroactive excise taxes. The Act, passed in 1864, which no one
contested, was passed in the period of war and the national war
hysteria uniformly denounces every act opposed to the successful
prosecution of the national effort. If any person has been willing
to begin a contest in those critical periods, without doubt the
question would have been deemed unpatriotic. Reason always
surrenders to desire, and the courts participate in intense na-
tional feelings.
But, as is clearly pointed out by Justice Brandeis in his dis-
senting opinion in the case of Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Company, 285 U. S. 393, even stare decisis is not as final upon
constitutional questions as upon other law principles. He says:
"This is strikingly true under the due process clause when the
question is whether a statute is unreasonable, arbitrary or capri-
cious." If, upon the application of the constitution, the reasoned
opinions of the Supreme Court are not controlling, then, in
reason, mere public inaction should not be even persuasive. The
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present writer does not believe that any authority, except obiter,
supports the conclusions of Justice Brandeis and Justice Hand
in the quotations above written.
The limitation of the power of Congress to impose retroactive
excise taxes results from the Fifth Amendment. The recognition
by the courts that a tax could violate the 5th Amendment was
slow in developing. Thus, in Frew v. Bowers, supra, decided in
1926, the court was unable to find any authority directly ruling
that a tax could violate the 5th Amendment. It said:
"But it is answered that this result goes only to the equal
assessment of the tax and must rest upon the Fifth Amend-
ment, which does not apply to federal taxation. I quite agree
that the Supreme Court has in many cases implied or said
as much (Citations). If the rule is to be taken uncondition-
ally, taxpayers may be selected by lot and assessments may
vary with the price of wheat. Perhaps it would have been
necessary to go so far, had it not been for the opinions in
Brushaber v. Union Pacific, 240 U. S. 1, and Barclay & Co.
v. Edwards, 267 U. S. 442, 450, and the strong intimations
in Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238, 251, 252. But these make
it clear that the power is not utterly absolute. A tax may be
so 'arbitrary and capricious,' its 'inequality' so 'gross and
patent,' that it will not stand, and as I can think of no other
pertinent constitutional limitation, but the Fifth Amend-
ment, it seems to me that the rule is not as stark as the de-
fendant argues. If there be any limit whatever, I own I
cannot, except in fancy, think of a case more plainly beyond
it than this."
The cases cited in the last quotation, by way of concession in
in the opinion, stated only that Congress may not confiscate
property under the guise of taxation or exercise general legisla-
tive powers not within the powers conferred upon it and the court
in 1926 did not find any authority freely supporting its ruling
that the Fifth Amendment imposed a limitation upon a conceded
tax.
The proposition, that a tax under a duly enacted statute, may
not be due process of law, developed more or less in step with
the attempted use of the taxing power to accomplish social re-
forms. The Court, until recent years, was not required to rule a
tax imposed by Congress violative of the Fifth Amendment,
because no tax imposed by Congress gave occasion for such
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ruling. In recent years a number of federal taxes have been held
confiscatory. In many of such cases, retroactivity was the sole
taint.
Thus, in Blodgett v. Holden 275 U. S. 142, the Court said:
"It seems wholly unreasonable that one who, in entire
good faith and without the slightest premonition of such
consequence, made absolute disposition of his property by
gifts should thereafter be required to pay a charge for so
doing."
This is in reference to a gift tax imposed by the act of June 2,
1924 and made retroactive to the beginning of the year.
In Untermeyer v. Anderson, supra, it was held that the fact
that the gift was made while the Revenue Act of 1924 was in
the last stages of progress through Congress, did not "relieve the
legislation of the arbitrary character." The Court said:
"The taxpayer may justly demand to know when and how he
becomes liable for taxes-he cannot foresee and ought not to
be required to guess the outcome of pending measures. The
future of every bill while before Congress is necessarily un-
certain. The will of the lawmakers is not definitely expressed
until final action thereon has been taken."
In both of the last cited cases, the gift tax imposed by the Act
of June 2, 1924 was held invalid so far as it attempted to impose
a tax upon gifts made prior to the passage of the Act. Lewellyn
v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238, ruled that the Revenue Act of 1918 (in-
cluding for estate tax, insurance under policies taken out by a
decedent upon his own life) does not apply to policies the right
to the proceeds of which had vested in the beneficiaries before
the passage of the statute. This was a construction of that par-
ticular statute. But in Industrial Trust Company v. United
States, 80. L. Ed. 208, decided December 9, 1935, the Court held
that if any of the retroactive provisions of the Revenue Act of
1926 apply to such a policy "the provision is open to grave doubt
as to its constitutionality."
In Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, the Court said:
"Under the mere guise of reaching something within its
powers Congress may not lay a charge upon what is beyond
them. . . . Section 402 (c) of the statute, insofar as it
requires that there shall be included in the gross estate the
value of property transferred by a decedent prior to its
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passage merely because the conveyance was intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death, is arbi-
trary, capricious and amounts to confiscation."
In Helvering v. Helmholz, 80 L. Ed. 5, the decedent, with
others, had created a trust which they could terminate by joint
action. Under the act subsequently passed providing for the
inclusion of trusts which the grantor may revoke, either alone or
in conjunction with any other person, it was sought to include
in the gross estate of decedent, the value of the property trans-
ferred upon this trust. The court said:
"Another and more serious objection to the application of
Sec. 302 (d) in the present instance is its retroactive opera-
tion. The transfer was complete at the time of the creation
of the trust. There remained no interest in the grantor.
She reserved no power in herself alone to revoke, to alter or
to amend. Under the revenue act then in force the transfer
was not taxable as intended to take effect in possession or
in enjoyment at her death. If Sec. 302 (d) of the Act of
1926 could fairly be considered as intended to apply in the
instant case its operation would violate the Fifth Amend-
ment. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531."
On the other hand, as to a similar trust created after the pas-
sage of the act, the court ruled in Helvering v. City Bank Farm-
ers Trust Company, 80 L. ed. 1:
"A legislative declaration that a status of the taxpayer's
creation shall, in the application of the tax, be deemed the
equivalent of another status falling normally within the
scope of the taxing power, if reasonably requisite to prevent
evasion, does not take property without due process; ... .
In the case of White v. Poor, 80 L. ed. 8, the court ruled:
"An estate tax law cannot, consistently with due process,
be so applied as to tax property in which decedent trans-
ferred, prior to its enactment, his entire interest without
reservation of power to revoke, alter, or amend."
One must draw a narrow line to discover the controlling dis-
tinction. In the writer's opinion, it is this:
The question does not depend upon hardship or fairness in the
particular case. Taxation must be confined to lawful subjects
"even although in some particular instance no great harm may
be done." The fairness or justice of the statute is determined
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by the legislature. The courts can consider only the constitutional
power of the legislature to enact the statute.
Where any part of the right which is excised, as for instance
the receipt of income for the year, has not been finally exercised
when the taxing act is passed, the tax is not necessarily arbitrary
and capricious so that the court, approaching the question with
that delicacy which one branch of the government should enter-
tain toward the acts of a coordinate branch, can disregard it
under the Constitution. Congress may write such rules effective
thereafter as are appropriate and necessary for prevention of
evasion of taxes. It may, if reasonably appropriate to that pur-
pose, fix the taxable status, after the passage of the statute, of
any acts or arrangements which a citizen may thereafter do or
establish.
If completely retroactive excise taxes were permissible in any
case, the courts could enforce no limitations except those written
in the statute, which might impose the tax, say upon income
received twenty years before, long after it was spent or had be-
come capital, or upon estates of persons who were dead ten years.
The legislature does not ask the consent of the citizen for the
imposition of taxes. They are "in invitum." If the legislature
imposes them validly, the citizen is compelled to pay them. There
must be some reason why the particular citizen is selected for
the payment of tax. The legislature cannot select persons by
name, that is, particular individuals, and impose a tax upon
them. This would be confiscation.
An excise tax, upon the exercise of a privilege, it is said, is
laid without rule or principle. But the occasion for the incidence
of the tax being the exercise of a privilege or right, it can be
imposed only on one who enjoys and exercises such privilege or
right. A tax upon the exercise of a privilege is similar to a
penalty for a violation of the law. The penalty can be imposed
only upon the guilty.
No one contradicts that a law is tyrannical which imposes a
penalty upon an act which, when the act was done, one was at
liberty to do without any liability. Such a law is prohibited under
the constitution as ex post facto. Identically the same logic con-
demns the imposition of a civil liability-a tax-for the exercise
of a privilege after the privilege has been exercised.
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A tax which is imposed upon a man for something he has
already done and which possibly he would not have done if he
had been forewarneai, is pure caprice. An excise is hateful in
itself, because it conditions rights which men consider belong
to them naturally. (Beals v. State, 139 Wis. 1. c. 555.) Even
the Government cannot reverse the order of events in times of
their happening. After an act is done, it is not possible to impose
a condition upon the doing of the act. The imposition in that
event is not a condition for doing the thing, but a penalty for
having done it.
Due process of law requires "a pre-existing rule of conduct,
not an act of the legislature framed to take away the very rights
whose destruction is complained of" (Wynehamer v. People, 13
N. Y. 378). In principle, an excise tax is imposed upon the
exercise of a privilege. The past enjoyment of a privilege affords
nothing for present tax. There is not presently anything to tax
merely because at some former time one did an act he then could
do without tax. To tax one because in the past he did an act, or
enjoyed a privilege, is without reason. The occasion of selection
for tax-an act already done-is necessarily arbitrary and ca-
pricious-pure tyranny-like advising a man for the first time
that he must account for his past meal.
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